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chapter 14
Patronage and Ethnicity amongst Politically Active 
Young Kenyans
Eija Ranta
 Introduction
When I met Garakilo in the sunlit courtyard of the University of Nairobi, this 
normally calm and prudent young student was simmering with the anger of 
deep disappointment. Born in the Rift Valley with roots in the north east-
ern corner of rural Kenyan borderlands, he had always been active in party 
politics: prior to 2012 in the Kenya African National Union (kanu), Kenya’s 
sole political party during the long one-party state era, and after that, in the 
National Alliance (tna), the leading party of the current governing coali-
tion known as the Jubilee Alliance. During campaigning, the tna explicitly 
portrayed itself as a youthful party, which gave Garakilo high hopes for the 
possibility of social change that would benefit Kenya’s large but often dis-
regarded majority: the youth. After less than two years from the seemingly 
successful political victory, his anticipation had, however, turned into mere 
frustration and, to an extent, anger. He felt that the youth had been bypassed 
once again. “If, [as a young person in party politics], you don’t have money, 
forget it,” he said to me. “Only the thieves will make it,” he observed discon-
solately as harsh sunlight came out from behind the trees of the patio and 
briefly blinded him.
John, on the other hand, was of the opposing camp. Born in Western  Kenya, 
he was a youth leader in one of the political parties belonging to the  Coalition 
for Reforms and Democracy (cord), a conglomeration in the  Kenyan par-
liament opposing the governing regime. Having started his political activ-
ism in the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (ford-Kenya), which 
had  effectively challenged the one-party rule of the kanu during the 1990s, 
he  portrayed himself as a fierce believer in democratization through party 
 politics. Yet being part of a politically marginalized ethnic group, he felt that 
what he called the “ethnicization of party politics” was the main reason for 
their continued presence in the opposition – and a major challenge for the 
youth of Kenya  because, in his opinion, political parties, including those in 
the opposition, were identified with “the ethnic naming of the leader”. Despite 
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these challenges, he  retained the anticipation of democratic change. I became 
acquainted with both of these politically active young Kenyans through a 
youth political network that was supported by the international development 
donor community.
From the perspective of the emergence of young leaders in the centres of 
Kenyan politics, the 2013 elections have been perceived as a major  success by 
many (Elder, Stigant and Claes 2014). Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto – the 
elected president and vice-president respectively – explicitly portrayed 
themselves as representing the fresh and dynamic younger generations of 
the  digitalized social media era against the elderly and stagnated status 
quo politicians (Muna, Stanton and Mwau 2014, 1390–1391). At the age of 51, 
 Kenyatta was, indeed, the youngest among the Kenyan post-independence 
presidents in comparison to Mwai Kibaki elected at the age of 71 (2002), Jomo 
 Kenyatta at 70 (1964) and Daniel arap Moi at 54 (1978) (ibid., 1385). More 
importantly, a relatively large number of young people between the ages of 
18 and 35, which is the official definition of youth in the Kenyan constitution 
( Republic of  Kenya 2010, Section 260), were either elected or nominated to 
the parliament. Kenya’s 2010 constitution introduced affirmative action, that 
is, youth quotas both for the Senate – one young man and one young woman 
 nominated by political parties – and for the National Assembly – twelve seats 
for youth, persons with disabilities and workers – in order to strengthen the 
enhancement of the political rights of the youth cohort. With 5.9 per cent 
of Members of Parliament (mps) under the age of 30, Kenya became the top 
country worldwide in the number of youth at the Upper House of Parliament 
(Inter-Parliamentary Union 2014, 9). An estimated 75 per cent of  Kenyans 
are less than 30 years old, while 39 per cent are aged between twenty and 
 forty-nine (Muna, Stanton and Mwau 2014, 1383). Given the demographic 
majority of youth in Kenya, this political transformation appears as justi-
fied – yet insufficient.
This chapter examines how young people active in party politics portray 
their hardships and obstacles while trying to enter parliamentary political 
 forums. It discusses how they narrate the complex relationships – and appar-
ent contradictions – between an assumedly youth-friendly political shift and 
real-life experiences of marginalization on the basis of two issues: political 
 patronage and ethnicity. While political patronage and ethnicity have been 
widely and exhaustively debated in scholarly literature on African politics, 
they still resonate strongly in the experiences and narratives of these  politically 
active young Kenyans. Through the examination of these issues, the chapter 
touches upon the delicate and constantly shifting boundaries between exclu-
sion and inclusion, hopes and despair.
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Methodologically, the chapter draws on interviews with nine young mem-
bers of political parties, four activists in youth organizations, and one former 
 student politician currently a political strategist for an oppositional political 
party.1 Four of the political party members were women, while the rest were 
men. However, the chapter is narrated predominantly through the stories of 
 Garakilo and John,2 who were exceptionally analytical when elaborating on the 
importance of the intersectionality between age, class, and ethnicity in  Kenyan 
politics. Their views effectively represented the general feelings among my in-
formants with the exception that they were more self-reflexive about their own 
political parties. The interviews were conducted during fieldwork in July 2014 
and January 2015. I acquired prior knowledge of the issues related to political 
participation in Kenya during a commissioned research for the  Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs of Finland on its development cooperation programme, which 
included study of the massive electoral aid provided by the foreign donor com-
munity for the 2013 elections (Katsui et al. 2014). The fieldwork for that purpose 
was conducted during October and November 2013.
 Political Patronage among Party Formations
I interviewed Garakilo in January 2015. He told me that his political career 
had started as a youth leader in the kanu. From 2012 onwards, however, he 
had joined the group that supported the presidency of Uhuru Kenyatta who 
subsequently, formed the tna for that purpose. Why had he then become so 
disappointed so soon after the tna had won the elections? One incident that 
explains it partly had happened in his community of origin. As a member of 
the tna, Garakilo had had an interest in standing for parliament in the 2013 
elections. However, he had been asked by the leaders of his community – all 
male and much older than himself – to step down and to make way for a se-
nior candidate. As all decisions related to politics were made in these male 
elders’ community meetings, “What they say is what will go on and will be 
accepted by all community members”, he stated. He concluded that although 
many younger people tend to have more education and experiences outside 
1 Although this chapter focuses on youth in political parties, it is acknowledged here that 
much youth political activism in Kenya occurs outside formal parliamentary forums includ-
ing such ‘legitimate’ forums as ngos, mainstream churches, student unions, and sports clubs, 
as well as politically more contradictory arenas such as charismatic religious movements, 
militias and gangs (Frederiksen 2010, 1079).
2 These are pseudonyms.
Eija Ranta - 9789004356368
Downloaded from Brill.com02/07/2020 01:10:19PM
via University of Helsinki
233Patronage and Ethnicity
<UN>
the community than the elders, “[They] have a disadvantage, because they do 
not have a say in [community] meetings: it is a taboo to talk in front of the 
elders”. Through his participation in the tna activities, he had searched for an 
opportunity to change this pattern. However, his real-life experiences inside 
the party did not live up to his expectations, as the following excerpt from the 
interview with Garakilo demonstrates:
When I joined the tna, most of the campaign and the policies that we 
used in tna was that it is a youthful party. Although the leadership of the 
party was just chosen not elected, most of them were young people who 
are thirty years and below. But we discovered that this was just used for 
[a] short time before the elections. And immediately after the elections, 
these young people who were given different tasks in the party, they are 
not there anymore. They are there just by name … So we discovered that 
this was another trick that is used by politicians, to use the name of the 
youth before the elections, and immediately they won the elections, most 
of the young people who engineered everything in the social media, in 
the campaign and everything, are no longer there … Most of the youth in 
Kenya are used by politicians, they’ll come and they’ll give you all the op-
portunities before the elections, but once the elections are done and they 
got what they want, then the youth are no more: they are not involving 
them in the decision making, they are not asked anything … And it’s not 
only in one-party, it’s the same thing in all the political parties … Things 
change immediately after elections, completely … Even the leadership 
will pretend to be very democratic and everything before elections and 
turn out to be very tough dictator in everything immediately after the 
elections are won.
Thus, Garakilo felt that, in the practice of national politics, he was experienc-
ing similar patterns of exclusion as in local politics, despite the promises to the 
contrary. The tna party politics seemed to include young men and women in 
their activities during political campaigning, but when the party had obtained 
decision-making powers the presence of the youth seemed to vanish. Gara-
kilo’s narrative also reflected a discrepancy between pre-election and post-
election times in terms of hope and pessimism. There was a hope for change 
during the pre-election era and a disappointment afterwards.
Garakilo’s feeling of being “used” by elderly decision makers, whether com-
munity leaders or politicians, was widely shared by many young Kenyans active 
not solely in formal party politics but also in ngos and activists groups. Many 
of them identified this with the phenomenon of political patronage widely 
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discussed in the academic literature on African politics and state  formation. 
Starting with the well-known work on neopatrimonialism by Chabal and 
Daloz (1999), political patronage has been associated with the exercise of pat-
rimonial power in Africa. As a contrast to modern, rational-legal bureaucra-
cies, patrimonialism in Weber’s sense refers to a type of state formation which 
is centred on the male ruler and his family. Stretching this to the context of 
modern Kenyan state formation, neopatrimonialism refers to the running of 
the postcolonial state through patron-client networks, where the president or 
some other major political leader (patron) distributes state resources, such as 
land, state contracts, and development projects, to his allies (clients) (Sundet 
and Moen 2009, 6). The logic behind this reciprocal patronage system is that 
“the distribution of material resources and the manipulation of state actions in 
favour of clients are important ways that patrons can increase their power and 
entrench their positions of influence” (Matter 2010, 69). Consequently, “rather 
than using their control of institutions like parliament, the presidency or the 
judiciary to protect Kenyans and their livelihoods, elites in power have tended 
to use their power to seize resources” (Branch 2011, 21–22).
In the case of his own community, Garakilo admitted that many perceived 
that if an elderly person were elected to the parliament, he would have more 
authority and wealth to “give stuff”, such as water or pasture, to community 
members than he as a young university student would be able to do. This situ-
ation occurs because, as one civil society activist noted: “Even if you don’t di-
rectly bribe people, you need to be shown as conducting harambees;3 those 
who do more harambees, stand better chances of being elected”. This implies 
that instead of the state or municipality functioning as a redistributive agent, 
the distribution – or non-distribution – of resources is seen by community 
members to be strongly dependent on individual political leaders and their 
networks (Branch 2011). As a result, people tend to direct their support, and opt 
to become part of the patron-client networks, of the wealthier ones. Garakilo 
had made the same observation. He further demonstrated how hard it is for 
young persons who have ideas but no resources to compete in the environ-
ment of these patron-client networks, as he told me in the interview:
In an election year, you’ll find a lot of money around. Everybody who 
wants to contest will come and look for a group of youth, “Where do you 
guys vote? Where do you guys stay? This place, this place”, and give you a 
3 Swahili notion of ‘working together’; established as a national slogan in Kenya by the first 
post-independence regime.
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few thousands of shillings to share among the group. People will vote the 
people from whom they got money. So, there is this young person who 
is just selling ideas and policies he thinks he will implement after being 
elected and then this other guy is giving out money throughout: when 
you are sick, you’ll find him in the hospital to pay for your hospital bill; 
he is going to schools making donations, buying probably a school bus. 
So, people [draw a conclusion] that if this guy is giving us all this money 
now, it will be even much better when he is elected. But what they don’t 
realize is that, immediately after being elected, he starts trying to recover 
the money he used in the elections, through dubious means, by taking 
public funds. From public funds he is taking back the same money that 
he used for the elections, and even more for [ financing] the next election 
[campaigns]. So the issue is that you will find that many youth, who are 
interested in politics, are held back because they don’t have money.
Garakilo’s views of the importance of money – or its lack – in Kenyan poli-
tics were shared by many politically active young men and women. An activist 
from a Nairobi-based ngo suggested that in Kenya, political parties have not 
historically started as peoples’ movements or social movements, but rather as 
personal creations of what he called the “moneyed-old”. Former student politi-
cian and a political strategist for one oppositional political party, on his part, 
alleged that “Kenyan political party formations emerge from individuals, who 
are rich and have the resources to run the political machinery”. This is apt to 
lead to political patronage, because it “comes from how much you have origi-
nally contributed to the party”, as one aspiring youth leader in an oppositional 
party noted. In regards to the possibilities of young men and women to emerg-
ing as candidates in the parliamentary elections, “How close you are to the 
leader”, he continued, “affects your nomination”. Many of those who have been 
able to enter into politics might be perceived as having been successful in, as 
the activist from youth ngo commented, “allying with the old who run politi-
cal parties”. This resembles Frederiksen’s (2010, 1079) remark that in addition 
to ngos, churches and ethnic associations, youth politics may take place in 
“ party-political movements closely associated with ‘big men’, particularly ac-
tive at elections”.
Consequently, although Garakoli admitted that there were young men and 
women who had been able to enter into parliamentary politics through their 
ideas rather than money, especially in major cities such as Nairobi, it was diffi-
cult for him to perceive them as agents of change. He felt that it was extremely 
difficult for young people to become active political subjects through other 
means than by conforming to the rules of political patronage. In regards to 
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this, the above mentioned political strategist commented to me in the same 
lines:
If we talk about youth participation, to be honest with you, they come 
more as appendixes to rich persons … Most political formations … are 
more or less closed clubs of few individuals, sometimes even one indi-
vidual. Throughout the history of party life from 1992 up to now, you can 
see youth as being used … The person who has the money; the financial 
power, is the person who will have the loyalty of the youth. I refuse to 
call it youth participation: it is youth co-option. Most youth that will find 
themselves in political office, are those youth who enjoy good will not so 
much from the political voter but enjoy the good will of the owners of 
political [parties]. Mostly [the youth] are political and ideological exten-
sions of political elites…
What he seems to be suggesting here is that there appears to be a tendency 
in Kenyan party politics for politically active young people to be co-opted 
into complex networks of political patronage by wealthy political figures. 
Following the same line of thinking, it has been remarked that “like eth-
nicity, generational identities have been manipulated and instrumental-
ized by Africa’s patrimonial elite” (Kagwanja 2005, 53). In a situation in 
which the distribution of state, municipal, and other resources is depen-
dent on individual political leaders rather than formal, institutionalized 
mechanisms through which benefits and services are circulated, it appears 
to be difficult for young women and men to challenge the logics of politi-
cal patronage. In the following, I will add the dimension of ethnicity to the 
discussion.
 Mastering Ethnic Networks
I met John for the first time in a capacity building event organized jointly by 
a Washington-based, democracy-promoting ngo and a Nordic development 
ngo whose objectives included, among others, the enhancement of youth 
political participation and the strengthening of political parties. There were 
approximately forty participants from various political parties in this “inter-
party forum for the youth”. John was representing his political party in which 
he served as the national youth leader and a member of its management com-
mittee. He had striven to become a candidate in the 2013 parliamentary elec-
tions but had, to his disappointment, lost to a fellow party member. However, 
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he had not lost hope but was rather determined, if resources would allow, to 
run as a candidate for the parliament in the elections in 2017.
When I later met John at his party’s office, our discussions touched upon 
political patronage, to which he brought a new dimension. The major issue 
that he wanted to tackle during the interview was ethnicity and its significance 
for party politics in Kenya. He perceived “the ethnicization of political parties” 
as the major problem because, in his opinion, “You can’t build political parties 
as institutions, as instruments of governance, because as they stand now they 
are like ethnic blocks without ideology”. He suggested in the interview that, 
“Most political parties [are formed] on the basis of individuals leading those 
parties. For instance, if a political party is formed and lead by a person from 
my community, then I make it my political party…” Garakoli had addressed this 
same phenomenon in our interview by calling political parties “private compa-
nies”. Thus, he listed that the tna belonged to Uhuru Kenyatta, the United Re-
publican Party (urp) to William Ruto and the Orange Democratic Movement 
Party (odm) to Raila Odinga, the main opposition leader. He perceived them 
as patrons governing and controlling party politics within the Kenyan political 
landscape. Political patronage appears to be intimately linked with ethnic af-
filiation because, as John, on his part, noted, “The leader of the political party 
is like the king of the tribe or ethnic group”. Kenyatta, Ruto and Odinga, it was 
noted, represent the Kikuyu, the Kalenjin and the Luo communities respec-
tively. Curiously enough, in the case of Garakoli his ethnic background did not 
correspond with that of the tna. In fact, the same applied to two other youth 
politicians from the governing coalition with whom I interacted. While their 
discourses about Kenyan politics were saturated with references to ethnicity, 
their own ethnic origins did not correspond with those that they themselves 
identified with the governing regime but rather with those of the politically 
marginalized opposition.
It is well-known that colonialism was instrumental in trying to encapsu-
late fluid social identities into ethnically fixed categories as part of its divide 
and rule policies (Kakai 2010; Karega-Munene 2010; Zeleza 2014). According 
to Mamdani (1996), the colonial state created ethnically based authoritarian 
governing mechanisms. In Kenya, European settlements were established as 
buffer zones in order to protect the British monopoly over the fertile Kenyan 
highlands and to weaken historically vivid intermingling among local commu-
nities (Kakai 2010, 37). Furthermore, each group was assigned specific labour 
positions (for example, the Kikuyu worked in the fields, the Luo were domestic 
servants), which further intensified ethnic categorization (ibid., 37–38). While 
the decolonization process was firmly grounded on nationalist discourses of 
unity and development, the silencing of political spaces and the shift towards 
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one-party state gradually caused ideological debates to wither away.  Instead, as 
Zeleza (2014, 26) has noted, “ethnic mobilization and contestations  assumed 
greater salience”. Ideological battles between pro-West conservatives and 
 socialist radicals were transformed into hostilities and rivalry, mainly between 
the Kikuyu and the Luo, the former governing the centralized state power. 
 Although Moi, Kenya’s dictatorial ruler for nearly 25 years, stressed the impor-
tance of Kenyan nationalism, he appointed members of his own ethnic group 
(the Kalenjin) into state positions that were previously held by the Kikuyu dur-
ing the presidency of Kenyatta (Kakai 2010, 42). Subsequently, the  Kikuyu and 
the Kalenjin have dominated the Kenyan political scene, while other group-
ings have remained predominantly in the political opposition.4 This has had 
concrete political-economic consequences, because it has been shown that 
in Kenya, both the distribution of state resources and the appointment of 
state officials have systematically favoured the ethnic community of the rul-
ing president (Hulterström 2007; see also Nyanchoga 2014). In relation to this, 
one young man from an oppositional party aspiring to enter parliament noted 
to me, “The stakes are very high, because people know that if you win, your 
people will benefit”.
John, together with many other politically active young Kenyans, perceived 
that ethnic politics was a major problem for the youth because senior male 
politicians and community leaders have a very strong hold on the governing 
and controlling of ethnically determined patron-client networks. Some said 
that sometimes party leaders seemed to think that the right time for the youth 
to enter into politics came solely when “their grandfathers’ networks have 
 expired”. The case of the current president illustrates the point. Perceived as 
a young and fresh candidate, he was, at the same time, perceived by many 
as the legitimate heir of his father’s political legacy. Thus, he was considered 
by many as having inherited his father’s ethnic networks and the position as 
the representative of the Kikuyu community, although not without ambigui-
ties. For those young men and women without ties to existing political family 
 dynasties, the opportunities were few, as John told me:
If political parties are identified on basis of ethnicity and the ethnic 
naming of the leader, then they are so closed and political space is very, 
very narrow. And if the political space is narrow, then it’s very difficult 
for young people without resources to penetrate that narrow stream 
4 It is often proposed that there are 42 ethnic groups in Kenya, the largest in number being the 
Kikuyu, Luhya, Luo, Kalenjin, Kamba, Kisii, Mijikenda, Somali and Meru (National Council 
for Population and Development 2013, 7).
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to  advance to senior political positions … This ethnic basis of political 
 parties gives normally preference to [such] old people with money who 
support the interests of the party. They are given certificates and party 
positions. But for young people just struggling we don’t have resources, 
we don’t have nothing apart from our brains and time.
According to John, this exclusion had been historically constructed.
During the ruling kanu era, most young people worked as youth-wingers; 
you were like the foot soldiers of the party. You were not given any role; 
your role was just to protect the party interests. When the party leaders 
wanted to go to a certain area, it was the youth-wingers who were given 
weapons, you see, to protect them. That narrative has continued to affect 
youth leadership, because till now, if you say that you are a youth leader 
of a party you are associated with being a youth-winger, and not with the 
institution in which you could do policies and contribute to the party. 
You are seen just as a security man for political parties. And that is killing 
the motivation for most young people to venture into politics.
During the one-party era, intergenerational division of labour tended to place 
youth predominantly in informal and illegitimate political spaces, while formal 
political arenas were occupied by the so-called ‘Old Guard’, “those believed to 
be unwilling to change and accept new ideas” (Muna, Stanton and Mwau 2014, 
1378). Jomo Kenyatta, for example, used the youth wings of the kanu to weak-
en political rivals, while Moi employed them for political terror and extortion 
(Kagwanja 2005, 55). Accordingly, Kenyan political scientist Adams Oloo (2010, 
150) has stated that “all elections during the one-party era witnessed violence 
meted out by youth-wingers, with prominent politicians hiring them to harass 
and disrupt their opponents’ rallies”.
John told me that, in his opinion, ethnic politics is the major cause for 
 political violence in Kenya, “If you belong to another community then after 
elections if your community won, [other communities] are attacking you 
 saying that you stole my victory”. He concluded, “That is the basis for most 
conflicts and political violence in Kenya, because every community wants to 
lead”. Indeed, except for the 2002 elections, organized violence, such as the 
use of youth militias to intimidate opposing candidates and sexual violence 
against women candidates and voters, has been part of all elections in Kenya 
 (Sundet and Moen 2009, 10). In 2007, the post-electoral violence led to more 
than 1,200 deaths and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people 
(Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2008, 5). Violence,  torture 
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and  killings, although occasionally spontaneous, were systematically orga-
nized and  financed by politically and economically affluent senior male poli-
ticians and conducted by youth militias, youth gangs and sometimes police 
officers and military personnel (Sundet and Moen 2009, 10–11). Even after the 
 post-electoral violence and the realization of the urgent need to open up for-
mal political forums for the youth, it was the older generation that was “fast 
to seize power behind closed doors and got away with the significant [govern-
mental] positions” (Muna, Stanton and Mwau 2014, 1390).
Ethnicity, or what Lonsdale (1994) calls ‘political tribalism’, has arguably 
been one of the key drivers of politics in Kenya. It has even been suggested that 
political parties in Kenya, even more so than elsewhere in Africa, are predomi-
nantly organized by ethnic groups rather than ideological differences, class 
concerns or occupational matters (Hulterström 2007). Kinship and lineage 
based collectivities, community organizations and ethnic identification are 
not important solely for identity construction and the sense of belonging but 
also for economic survival. As Branch (2011, 293–294) has suggested, ethnicity 
is not the cause but a symptom of a weak sense of nationhood and a non-redis-
tributive state that does not even out the colossal gaps between narrow elites 
and the poor masses. In contexts where state formation processes have been 
constructed through colonial conquest and violence as well as various forms of 
neocolonial dependency relations, people tend to identify with other kinds of 
collectivities rather than with the state. Branch (2011, 293) continues that what 
ethnicity brings to the people is what the state does not: trust.
In the absence of redistribution, ethnicity provided a way in which Ke-
nyans could access and protect the scarce resources of land, jobs and 
political power. The networks of kin encouraged by ethnicity provided 
for access to plots of land, work and housing on a reciprocal basis. The 
networks of patronage meant that, if their political leader became an mp 
or a minister (or even president), then the roads in their district might 
be repaired, the moribund local factory rejuvenated or the village school 
expanded. Ethnicity was not irrational and nor was it an expression of 
traditionalism; instead it was a logical response to an experience of the 
modern world in which resources are scarce…
branch 2011, 294
Consequently, “ethnic identification keeps together a ‘moral community’ which 
often, and especially in times of crisis, provides support and functions as the 
sounding board for communal values and experience” (Frederiksen 2010, 1074). 
Yet, at the same time, the “politicization of ethnicity has been a key technique 
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used by the changing political regimes and elites first in  colonial, then in post-
colonial Kenya” (ibid., 1073). Branch (2011, 16–17) has suggested that elites have 
encouraged political identification and action first and  foremost through eth-
nicity, “in order to crush demands for the redistribution of scarce resources”. 
In other words, ethnicity is used by elites and other groups in order to avoid 
addressing larger structural issues connected with poverty and inequality, 
namely, those related to the redistribution of lands, means of production, jobs 
and political power.
The way public resources are distributed through patrimonial relationships, 
that again generate ethnic divisions, seems to link the accounts of these two 
young men. An institutionalized state apparatus that is driven by civil servants 
and policies is the missing link here, I would argue, rather than just possibili-
ties for the young to participate. A public sector that is truly democratic rather 
than patrimonial might be what is needed before young aspiring politicians 
have a real chance, regardless of class or ethnic belonging. Based on my inter-
views, unfortunately the training workshops organized by the ngos also focus 
on the capabilities of individual youths but overlook the structural and insti-
tutional issues of the public sector which seems to enable or hamper youth 
participation, and cause so much frustration.
 Conclusions
This chapter has investigated how politically active young Kenyans describe 
and understand the difficulties that they face when they participate in party 
politics and are struggling to find a way into parliamentary political forums. 
Although already widely discussed in academic literature on African politics, 
I chose to focus on the topics of political patronage and ethnicity because of 
their overwhelming presence in the narratives of those politically active young 
Kenyans with whom I interviewed and interacted. By focusing especially on 
the narratives of Garakilo and John, this chapter has showed that despite the 
assumedly youth-inclusive political shift, young people active in party politics 
continue to experience various forms of obstacles and exclusions in their po-
litical careers.
Through Garakilo’s discussion of political patronage one is tempted to reach 
the conclusion that as long as the distribution of state, municipal and other 
resources is dependent on individual political leaders rather than formal, insti-
tutionalized mechanisms through which state benefits and services find their 
ways to citizens on an equal basis, it will be difficult for young people to chal-
lenge the logics of political patronage. And, at the moment, as Ake (2003, 116) 
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has put it: “the state is not so much a reality as a hope…” While party politics 
has opened up forums for youth political engagement and inclusion, especial-
ly in pre-electoral periods, young men and women have hard time breaking 
through to positions of power due to their lack of resources and political au-
thority both at local and national political levels. Unless already intertwined in 
political networks through family ties, young people have little room for ma-
noeuvre in party politics without the protection of wealthy political patrons. 
Until state resources are distributed in an institutionalized manner rather 
than on patrimonial principles, young political leaders, when they finally en-
ter  political positions of power, risk becoming exactly like their elders, because 
the room for change seems so narrow and unrealistic. The capacity-building 
workshops organized by the ngos could be an arena where this is tackled re-
alistically and across party lines, as it frustrates youth regardless of party af-
filiation. Yet structural issues have to be discussed in training sessions as well.
The other side of the coin of political patronage is the co-option and manip-
ulation of youth for the purposes of serving the interests of party elites. They 
are most often senior male leaders of their respective ethnic groups. Ethnicity 
forms an important source of identity and establishes a sense of belonging to 
a collectivity. Yet throughout Kenyan history, from colonialism to contempo-
rary centralized presidentialism, there have been attempts by those in power 
to congeal fluid identities into fixed ethnic categories in order to serve elite 
interests: to protect and to accumulate wealth and to obstruct any attempts 
at challenging elite privileges ideologically and through structural reforms. 
Through John’s views on ethnicity in Kenyan politics it was demonstrated that 
in this kind of political situation young men and women tend to be co-opted 
into ethnic networks. Instead of allying with other youth on the basis of com-
mon issues or ideology, they are used by senior party leaders to agitate ethnic 
hatred and violence against each other.
However, this was not the whole truth. As mentioned earlier, while politi-
cally active young Kenyans talked a lot about the importance of ethnicity in 
politics, three of my informants did not in fact belong to the parties that were 
most closely identified with their ethnic backgrounds. All of them came from 
politically marginalized ethnic groups, but were now supporting either the 
tna or the urp, leading parties of the governing regime. It is difficult to say 
whether this signalled political opportunism towards those in power or wheth-
er it hinted that while ethnicity played a major role in political discourses as a 
categorically stagnant concept, it was performed fluidly in the everyday politi-
cal practices of young Kenyans. Ultimately, youth lives appeared more com-
plex than their discourses.
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So, what will the future hold for such politically active young Kenyans as 
Garakilo and John? They were both hoping that issues other than money or 
ethnicity would determine the course of future politics in Kenya. They were 
expecting that in the future, Kenyan political parties would become formally 
organized and transparent institutions in which leadership positions would 
rotate democratically among all interested party members. Garakilo, who had 
had the experience of his party winning the elections, was, however, quite 
sceptical about whether these dreams would ever be realized. He perceived 
the youth to be as equally ethnically divided as older generations and consid-
ered ethnicity to be very deeply inscribed in Kenyan politics. However, despite 
all the disappointments he had faced in his own community and at national 
political forums, his last remark to me was that he might, nevertheless, con-
sider contesting in the next elections. This showed that he still cherished a 
spark of hope for change.
John, for his part, was hopeful all the way. So far his party had been un-
successful in winning parliamentary and presidential elections. Consequent-
ly, he still had the anticipation that, if that day comes, his party would do 
things differently. He was, however, fearful of political violence. He felt that 
the  resentment caused by constant exclusion of young men and women in 
 general – and more specifically of those belonging to politically marginalized 
ethnic groups and the political opposition – was a real danger. To avoid this, 
he tried to engage himself in constant dialogue between young men and wom-
en from other political parties and ethnic groups. And he was convinced that 
when he ruled, hopefully from the 2017 elections onwards, he would do things 
differently.
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